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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MATTHEW PAGANO, CARMEN
PAGANO, and MILLED PAGANO,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 13864
:

MARY P. WALKER,
Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The trial court based its decision upon:-the remedial and
equitable principles of constructive trust and recognized the
following principles set forth in the introductory note to
Chapter 12 of the American Law Institute Restatement of Trusts
Page
"A constructive trust is imposed, not because of the
intention of the parties, but because the person holding
title would profit by a wrong and would be unjustly
enriched if permitted to keep the property. A constructive
trust, unlike an express trust or resulting trust, is
remedial in character." (See Restatement of Restitution,
160.)
The majority of the Supreme Court erred in that it did not
recognize the foregoing fundamental difference between a
constructive trust and an express trust.

The opinion held that
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the judgment of the trial court in favor of the Plaintiffs
should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of the
Defendant for the following reasons:
1. That Plaintiff is required to prove that it was the
intention of the settlor to create a trust at the time of
the opening of the joint accounts.
2. That the terms of the trust created by the settlor
must be set forth with certainty.
ARGUMENT

..

If the theory upon which the Plaintiffs sought relief and
the trial court granted relief was that Mary was the Trustee
and the Plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of an express trust
then a reversal would be in order.

But the case before the court

is not one to enforce an express trust, and it should not be
judged on the standards required to establish or to enforce an
express trust.

The Plaintiffs seek relief in equity to establish

a constructive trust —

to call into play the equitable powers

of the court to prevent an unjust enrichment.
The opinion recites that the trial court found, on the
basis of clear and convincing evidence, that Mary Walker had
made the following statement regarding the bank accounts in
issue:
"Mother told me to pay her bills, keep a little
out for my arthritis and divide up the rest."
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The court's opinion states that:
"Even if the statement had been in writing,
signed by the mother, Lucy, there is doubt
that it should properly be regarded as sufficiently
specific to meet the requirements for the establishment of a trust for Plaintiff's benefit."
This statement shows that in reviewing this case the
court examined the evidence in the light of requiring the
Plaintiffs to produce evidence that would support the establishment of an express trust rather than evidence that would support
a constructive trust, which was the standard applied by the
trial court.

The remedial character of the constructive trust

is defined by Chief Judge Cardozo in cases decided by the Court
of Appeals of New York:

"A constructive trust is the formula which the
conscience of equity finds expression. Where property
• has been acquired under circumstances that the holder
of legal title may not in good conscience retain the
beneficial interest equity converts him into a
trustee."
Beaty v. Guggenheim Exploration
Company, 225 NY 380, 386,
122 NE 378 (1919)
"A constructive trust is then the remedial device
through which preference of self is made subordinate
to loyalty to others."
Meinhard v. Salmon, 259 NY 458,
467 NE 545, 62 A L R l (1928)
The claim of vagueness in Lucy's instruction to Mary regardin<
her savings account must be considered in the light of all the
circumstances rather than in the light of how would Lucy have
said it had she been a lawyer.

The statement was made by Mary
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at a time when she and her brothers were discussing the specific
bank accounts in issue.

The only persons concerned with these

accounts were Mary and her brothers Matthew, Carmen and Milleo.
All persons present knew that when she spoke directly to them
and said divide, that she meant divide the funds with them not
some stranger or collateral relative.
children.

They were all of Lucy's

What was to be divided by Mary in accordance with

Lucy's instruction?

It was what was left after Lucy's debts were

paid and Mary had kept a little out for her arthritis.
When Mary repudiated her Mother's instructions and determined
to keep all of the funds for herself, she puts her brothers in
a position where the only remedy available to them was the power
of the equity court.

The real issue is:

Is the court powerless

to prevent Mary from unjustly enriching herself by her own
wrongdoing?
The general rule concerning the acquisition of property
by a fiduciary is set forth in Sec. 190 of the American Law
Institute of the Restatement of Restitution:
"Where a person in
acquires property,
of the property is
he holds it upon a

a fiduciary relation to another
and the acquisition or retention
in violation of his duty as fiduciary,
constructive trust for the other."

The evidence in this case was clear and without dispute
that Mary was in a confidential relationship to her mother,
Lucy.

There is no evidence that Mary abused this confidential

relationship during the lifetime of her mother; therefore, it is
not unreasonable to assume that Lucy would believe that the simples
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and most inexpensive way to distribute the bulk of her estate
would be to rely on Mary to carry out her instruction to divide
the funds accumulated by her and her husband in a lifetime of
work with her children.
In an effort to clarify the Plaintiffs1 position, which
was apparently not made clear to the court, let us take the
position that Mary and Lucy were in a fiduciary relationship,
and further assume that in this fiduciary relationship Lucy
told Mary at a time when Lucy and Mary were discussing the
funds in the joint accounts:
"(Mary when I am gone) I want you to pay my bills,
keep a little out for your arthritis, and divide
the rest (with your brothers)."
And let us further assume that the above conversation has
been admitted - rather than as in this case, found by the court
upon clear and convincing evidence.

Then let us further assume

that Mary admitted this conversation at a time when she and her
brothers met to discuss their mother's estate and to agree upon
an administrator with the will annexed.

Assume further that after

Mary had admitted she made such a statement that she then said,
"I will divide the money up if there isn't any
trouble." (Tr. 124) .
And assume further that at a later time she said:
"And furthermore I have decided not to divide the
money and I won't have a guilty conscience about
it—it's mine." (Tr 15)
Under such fact circumstances would this court have any
difficulty coming to the conclusion that when Mary said she was
not going to divide the money (in this case over $74,000.00) and
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was going to keep the entire amount for herself that she would
be unjustly enriched if the court permitted her to retain the
entire sum?
The illustrative fact situation set forth above is a
reasonable interpretation of the legal result of the finding of
the trial court based on the standard of clear and convincing
evidence.
The law applicable to such a fact situation is not the law
applicable to an express trust but is the law applicable to a
constructive trust as defined in Sec. 160 of the American Law
Institute Restatement of the Law of Restitution:
Sec. 160. Constructive Trust.
Where a person holding title to property is subject to
an equitable duty to convey it to another on the
ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises.
Comment:
a. Constructive trust and express trust. The term
"Constructive trust" is not altogether a felicitous
one. It might be thought to suggest the idea that
it is a fiduciary relation similar to an express trust,
whereas it is in fact something quite different from an
express trust. An express trust and a constructive
trust are not divisions of the same fundamental concept.
They are not species of the same genus. They are
distinct concepts. A constructive trust does not,
like an express trust, arise because of a manifestation
of an intention to create it but it is imposed as
a remedy to reprevent unjust enrichment. A constructive
trust,.unlike an express trust, is not a fiduciary
relation, although the circumstances which give rise
to a constructive trust may or may not involve a
fiduciary relation.
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It is true that both in the case of an express trust
and in that of a constructive trust one person holds
the title to property subject to an equitable duty to
hold the property for or to convey it to another and
the latter has in each case some kind of an equitable
interest in the property. In other respects, however,
there is little resemblance between the two relationships.
An attempt to define a trust in such a way as to include
constructive trusts as well as express trusts is futile,
since a single definition which would include such distinct
ideas would be so general as to be useless. A constructive
trust differs from an express trust in much the same way
a quasi-contractual obligation differs from a contractual
obligation. On the other hand, a quasi-contractual
obligation and a constructive trust closely resemble each
other, the chief difference being that the Plaintiff in
bringing an action to enforce a quasi-contractual obligation seeks to obtain a judgment imposing a merely personal
liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of money, whereas
the Plaintiff in bringing a suit to enforce a constructive
trust seeks to recover specific property. For these reasons
Constructive Trusts are dealt with together with Quasi
Contracts in the Restatement of this Subject. Constructive
trusts are not dealt with in the Restatement of Trusts,
except in so far as they arise out of express trusts or
attempts to create express trusts.
The term "trust", when not modified by an adjective, is in
the Restatement of this Subject confined to express trusts
(see Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 1, 2) .
b. Constructive trust and resulting trust. A constructive
trust is also to be distinguished from a resulting trust.
A resulting trust arises where a transfer of property is
made under circumstances which raise an inference that the
person making the transfer or causing it to be made did not
intend the transferee to have the beneficial interest in the
property transferred. A constructive trust is imposed not
because of the intention of the parties but because the
person would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to
keep the property. The Trustee of a resulting trust, like
the Trustee of an express trust, is in a fiduciary relation
to the beneficiary of the trust. (See Restatement of Trusts,
Sees. 404-460).
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c. Unjust enrichment. A constructive trust is
imposed upon a person in order to prevent his unjust
enrichment. To prevent such unjust enrichment an
equitable duty to convey the property to another is
imposed upon him. There are many situations in which
a person holding title to property is subject to an
equitable duty to convey it to another. * * *
d. Unjust enrichment and unjust deprivation. In most
cases where a constructive trust is imposed the result
is to restore to the plaintiff property of which he
has been deprived and to take from the defendant property
the retention of which by him would result in a
corresponding unjust enrichment of the defendant; in
other words, the effect is to prevent a loss to the
Plaintiff and a corresponding gain to the defendant,
and to put each of them in the position in which he
was before the defendant acquired the property.
The Utah cases of Hawkins v. Perry, 123, Utah 16, 253 P 2
372, and Haws v. Jensen, 110 Utah 212, 209 P 2 229, and the
California case of Jovkieh v. Badaglicco, 170 P 2 984, set forth
in detail on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 of Respondent's brief, are
all cases which recognize and apply the equity principles herein
set forth in a manner consistant with Respondent's position.
A constructive trust also differs from an express trust in
the fact that since the constructive trust is a remedial feature
of the law of equity, it can be imposed at any time the court is
satisfied that the equitable requirements have been met.

Vol. 76

Am. Jur 2d Trusts states the rule as follows:
"Sec. 236. Where confidential relationship is present.
A constructive trust arises where a conveyance is
induced on the agreement of a fiduciary or confidant
to hold in trust for a reconveyance or other purpose,
where the fiduciary or confidential relationship is
one upon which the grantor justifiably can and does
rely and where the agreement is breached, since the
breach of the agreement is an abuse of the confidence,
and to establish such a trust it is not necessary to
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show fraud or intent not to perform the agreement
when it was made. The tendency of the courts is to
construe the term "confidence" or "confidential
relationship" liberally in favor of the confider and
against the confidant, for the purpose of raising a
constructive trust on a violation or betrayal thereof.
A parent and child, grandparent and child, or brother
and sister relationship is not intrinsically one of
confidence, but under certain circumstances involves a
confidence and abuse of which gives rise to a constructive trust in accordance with the terms of an agreement
or promise of a grantee to hold in trust or to
reconvey."
In the case of Sacre v. Sacre, 55 A 2 592,173 ALR 1261, 1271,
the court held:
"Whenever two persons stand in such a relation
that, while it continues, confidence is necessarily
reposed by one, and the influence which naturally grows
out of that confidence is possessed by the other, and
this confidence is abused, or the influence is exerted
to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding
party, the person so availing himself of his position
will not be permitted to retain the advantage, although
the transaction would not have been impeached if no such
confidential relation had existed."
CONCLUSION
The court's opinion totally emasculates the equitable
principal of unjust enrichment and constructive trust in respect
to a joint account.

The opinion opens the door to use the joint

account as a vehicle of fraud and unjust enrichment.
The court adopts a rule that sets the following precedent:
Even if the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that
the surviving joint tenant agreed with the person who supplied all
the funds to the joint account to distribute the proceeds in
accordance with directions given by the person who supplied the funds
then, because the claimant has not proved all the elements to
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 10
establish an express trust, the surviving party to the joint
account may disregard his agreement and retain the funds by virtue
of the fact he is holder of the legal title.
The court's opinion refuses to recognize the historical
powers of the chancery or equity court to hold the surviving member
of the joint account to his equitable duty, and further permits
such survivor to enrich himself by his own breach of duty.
It is respectfully submitted that the foregoing errors
justify the court in granting a re-hearing and re-examining this
case in the light of the equitable principles of unjust enrichment
and constructive trust.
Respectfully submitted,
KUNZ, KUNZ & RENCHER
DAVID S. KUNZ
#7 Bank of Utah Plaza
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Respondents
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MATTHEW PAGANO, CARMEN
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vs.

:

MARY P. WALKER,
•

'

-

.

•

•

.

•

-

•

•

•

•

•

Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The trial court based its decision upon:1 the remedial and
equitable principles of constructive trust and recognized the
following principles set forth in the introductory note to
Chapter 12 of the American Law Institute Restatement of Trusts
Page
"A constructive trust is imposed/ not because of the
intention of the parties, but because the person holding
title would profit by a wrong and would be unjustly
enriched if permitted to keep the property. A constructive
trust, unlike an express trust or resulting trust, is
remedial in character." (See Restatement of Restitution,
160.)
The majority of the Supreme Court erred in that it did not
recognize the foregoing fundamental difference between a
constructive trust and an express trust.

The opinion held that
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the judgment of the trial court in favor of the Plaintiffs
should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of the
Defendant for the following reasons:
1. That Plaintiff is required to prove that it was the
intention of the settlor to create a trust at the time of
the opening of the joint accounts.
2. That the terms of the trust created by the settlor
must be set forth with certainty.
ARGUMENT

..

If the theory upon which the Plaintiffs sought relief and
the trial court granted relief was that Mary was the Trustee
and the Plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of an express trust
then a reversal would be in order.

But the case before the court

is not one to enforce an express trust, and it should not be
judged on the standards required to establish or to enforce an
express trust.

The Plaintiffs seek relief in equity to establish

a constructive trust —

to call into play the equitable powers

of the court to prevent an unjust enrichment.
The opinion recites that the trial court found, on the
basis of clear and convincing evidence, that Mary Walker had
made the following statement regarding the bank accounts in
issue:
"Mother told me to pay her bills, keep a little
out for my arthritis and divide up the rest."
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The court's opinion states that:
"Even if the statement had been in writing,
signed by the mother, Lucy, there is doubt
that it should properly be regarded as sufficiently
specific to meet the requirements for the establishment of a trust for Plaintiff's benefit."
This statement shows that in reviewing this case the
court examined the evidence in the light of requiring the
Plaintiffs to produce evidence that would support the establishment of an express trust rather than evidence that would support
a constructive trust, which was the standard applied by the
trial court.

The remedial character of the constructive trust

is defined by Chief Judge Cardozo in cases decided by the Court
of Appeals of New York:

"A constructive trust is the formula which the
conscience of equity finds expression. Where property
has been acquired under circumstances that the holder
of legal title may not in good conscience retain the
beneficial interest equity converts him into a
trustee."
Beaty v. Guggenheim Exploration
Company, 225 NY 380, 386,
122 NE 378 (1919)
"A constructive trust is then the remedial device
through which preference of self is made subordinate
to loyalty to others."
Meinhard v. Salmon, 259 NY 458,
467 NE 545, 62 ALR 1 (1928)
The claim of vagueness in Lucy's instruction to Mary regarding
her savings account must be considered in the light of all the
circumstances rather than in the light of how would Lucy have
said it had she been a lawyer.

The statement was made by Mary
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at a time when she and her brothers were discussing the specific
bank accounts in issue*

The only persons concerned with these

accounts were Mary and her brothers Matthew, Carmen and Milleo.
All persons present knew that when she spoke directly to them
and said divide, that she meant divide the funds with them not
some stranger or collateral relative.
children.

They were all of Lucy's

What was to be divided by Mary in accordance with

Lucy's instruction?

It was what was left after Lucy's debts were

paid and Mary had kept a little out for her arthritis.
When Mary repudiated her Mother's instructions and determined
to keep all of the funds for herself, she puts her brothers in
a position where the only remedy available to them was the power
of the equity court.

The real issue is:

Is the court powerless

to prevent Mary from unjustly enriching herself by her own
wrongdoing?
The general rule concerning the acquisition of property
by a fiduciary is set forth in Sec. 190 of the American Law
Institute of the Restatement of Restitution:
"Where a person in
acquires property,
of the property is
he holds it upon a

a fiduciary relation to another
and the acquisition or retention
in violation of his duty as fiduciary,
constructive trust for the other."

The evidence in this case was clear and without dispute
that Mary was in a confidential relationship to her mother,
Lucy.

There is no evidence that Mary abused this confidential

relationship during the lifetime of her mother; therefore, it is
not unreasonable to assume that Lucy would believe that the simplest
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and most inexpensive way to distribute the bulk of her estate
would be to rely on Mary to carry out her instruction to divide
the funds accumulated by her and her husband in a lifetime of
work with her children.
In an effort to clarify the Plaintiffs1 position, which
was apparently not made clear to the court, let us take the
position that Mary and Lucy were in a fiduciary relationship,
and further assume that in this fiduciary relationship Lucy
told Mary at a time when Lucy and Mary were discussing the
funds in the joint accounts:
11

(Mary when I am gone) I want you to pay my bills,
keep a little out for your arthritis, and divide
the rest (with your brothers).11
And let us further assume that the above conversation has
been admitted - rather than as in this case, found by the court
upon clear and convincing evidence.

Then let us further assume

that Mary admitted this conversation at a time when she and her
brothers met to discuss their mother's estate and to agree upon
an administrator with the will annexed.

Assume further that after

Mary had admitted she made such a statement that she then said,
"I will divide the money up if there isn't any
trouble." (Tr. 124).
And assume further that at a later time she said:
"And furthermore I have decided not to divide the
money and I won't have a guilty conscience about
it—it's mine." (Tr 15)
Under such fact circumstances would this court have any
difficulty coming to the conclusion that when Mary said she was
not going to divide the money (in this case over $74,000.00) and
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was going to keep the entire amount for herself that she would
be unjustly enriched if the court permitted her to retain the
entire sum?
The illustrative fact situation set forth above is a
reasonable interpretation of the legal result of the finding of
the trial court based on the standard of clear and convincing
evidence.
The law applicable to such a fact situation is not the law
applicable to an express trust but is the law applicable to a
constructive trust as defined in Sec. 160 of the American Law
Institute Restatement of the Law of Restitution:
Sec. 160. Constructive Trust.
Where a person holding title to property is subject to
an equitable duty to convey it to another on the
ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises.
Comment:
a. Constructive trust and express trust. The term
"Constructive trust" is not altogether a felicitous
one. It might be thought to suggest the idea that
it is a fiduciary relation similar to an express trust,
whereas it is in fact something quite different from an
express trust. An express trust and a constructive
trust are not divisions of the same fundamental concept.
They are not species of the same genus. They are
distinct concepts. A constructive trust does not,
• like an express trust, arise because of a manifestation
of an intention to create it but it is imposed as
a remedy to reprevent unjust enrichment. A constructive
trust,, unlike .an express trust, is not a fiduciary
relation, although the circumstances which give rise
to a constructive trust may or may not involve a
fiduciary relation.
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It is true that both in the case of an express trust
and in that of a constructive trust one person holds
the title to property subject to an equitable duty to
hold the property for or to convey it to another and
the latter has in each case some kind of an equitable
interest in the property. In other respects, however,
there is little resemblance between the two relationships.
An attempt to define a trust in such a way as to include
constructive trusts as well as express trusts is futile,
since a single definition which would include such distinct
ideas would be so general as to be useless. A constructive
trust differs from an express trust in much the same way
a quasi-contractual obligation differs from a contractual
obligation. On the other hand, a quasi-contractual
obligation and a constructive trust closely resemble each
other, the chief difference being that the Plaintiff in
bringing an action to enforce a quasi-contractual obligation seeks to obtain a judgment imposing a merely personal
liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of money, whereas
the Plaintiff in bringing a suit to enforce a constructive
trust seeks to recover specific property. For these reasons
Constructive Trusts are dealt with together with Quasi
Contracts in the Restatement of this Subject. Constructive
trusts are not dealt with in the Restatement of Trusts,
except in so far as they arise out of express trusts or
attempts to create express trusts.
The term "trust", when not modified by an adjective, is in
the Restatement of this Subject confined to express trusts
(see Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 1, 2).
b. Constructive trust and resulting trust. A constructive
trust is also to be distinguished from a resulting trust.
A resulting trust arises where a transfer of property is
made under circumstances which raise an inference that the
person making the transfer or causing it to be made did not
intend the transferee to have the beneficial interest in the
property transferred. A constructive trust is imposed not
because of the intention of the parties but because the
person would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to
keep the property. The Trustee of a resulting trust, like
the Trustee of an express trust, is in a fiduciary relation
to the beneficiary of the trust. (See Restatement of Trusts,
Sees. 404-460).
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c. Unjust enrichment. A constructive trust is
imposed upon a person in order to prevent his unjust
enrichment. To prevent such unjust enrichment an
equitable duty to convey the property to another is
imposed upon him. There are many situations in which
a person holding title to property is subject to an
equitable duty to convey it to another. * * *
d. Unjust enrichment and unjust deprivation. In most
cases where a constructive trust is imposed the result
is to restore to the plaintiff property of which he
has been deprived and to take from the defendant property
the retention of which by him would result in a
corresponding unjust enrichment of the defendant; in
other words, the effect is to prevent a loss to the
Plaintiff and a corresponding gain to the defendant,
and to put each of them in the position in which he
was before the defendant acquired the property.
The Utah cases of Hawkins v. Perry, 123, Utah 16, 253 P 2
372, and Haws v. Jensen, 110 Utah 212, 209 P 2 229, and the
California case of Jovkieh v. Badaglicco, 170 P~ 984, set forth
in detail on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 of Respondent's brief, are
all cases which recognize and apply the equity principles herein
set forth in a manner consistant with Respondent's position.
A constructive trust also differs from an express trust in
the fact that since the constructive trust is a remedial feature
of the law of equity, it can be imposed at any time the court is
satisfied that the equitable requirements have been met.

Vol. 76

Am. Jur 2d Trusts states the rule as follows:
"Sec. 236. Where confidential relationship is present.
A constructive trust arises where a conveyance is
induced on the agreement of a fiduciary or confidant
to hold in trust for a reconveyance or other purpose,
where the fiduciary or confidential relationship is
one upon which the grantor justifiably can and does
rely and where the agreement is breached, since the
breach of the agreement is an abuse of the confidence,
and to establish such a trust it is not necessary to
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show fraud or intent not to perform the agreement
when it was made. The tendency of the courts is to
construe the term "confidence" or "confidential
relationship" liberally in favor of the confider and
against the confidant, for the purpose of raising a.
constructive trust on a violation or betrayal thereof.
A parent and child, grandparent and child, or brother
and sister relationship is not intrinsically one of
confidence, but under certain circumstances involves a
confidence and abuse of which gives rise to a constructive trust in accordance with the terms of an agreement
or promise of a grantee to hold in trust or to
reconvey."
In the case of Sacre v. Sacre, 55 A 2 592,173 ALR 1261, 1271,
the court held:
"Whenever two persons stand in such a relation
that, while it continues, confidence is necessarily
reposed by one, and the influence which naturally grows
out of that confidence is possessed by the other, and
this confidence is abused, or the influence is exerted
to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding
party, the person so availing himself of his position
will not be permitted to retain the advantage, although
the transaction would not have been impeached if no such
confidential relation had existed."
CONCLUSION
The court's opinion totally emasculates the equitable
principal of unjust enrichment and constructive trust in respect
to a joint account.

The opinion opens the door to use the joint

account as a vehicle of fraud and unjust enrichment.
The court adopts a rule that sets the following precedent:
Even if the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that
the surviving joint tenant agreed with the person who supplied all
the funds to the joint account to distribute the proceeds in
accordance with directions given by the person who supplied the funds
then, because the claimant has not proved all the elements to
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establish an express trust, the surviving party to the joint
account may disregard his agreement and retain the funds by virtue
of the fact he is holder of the legal title.
The court's opinion refuses to recognize the historical
powers of the chancery or equity court to hold the surviving member
of the joint account to his equitable dutyf and further permits
such survivor to enrich himself by his own breach of duty*
It is respectfully submitted that the foregoing errors
justify the court in granting a re-hearing and re-examining this
case in the light of the equitable principles of unjust enrichment
and constructive trust.
Respectfully submitted,
KUNZ, KUNZ & RENCHER
DAVID S. KUNZ
#7 Bank of Utah Plaza
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Respondents
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